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CLEAN SWEEP OR WITCH HUNT?: CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES IN CHICAGO'S PUBLIC HOUSING SWEEPS
DAVID E.B. SMITH*
INTRODUCTION
Describing life in America's public housing projects as "hell"' or
"Beirut U.S.A."'2 trivializes a desperately tragic situation.3 Random
gunfire and violent death are part of each child's education. Mothers
struggle to feed their children on the meager proceeds from welfare
checks or low-paying jobs. Alcohol and drug use and the associated
crime flourish. The buildings themselves crumble and decay from
years of neglect and bureaucratic ineptitude. Those who can escape
do, leaving behind in their wake an increasingly disadvantaged and
deprived underclass.4 The projects are increasingly seen as some
"other America," isolated from and feared by the rest of the nation.
In 1988 the Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA" or "Authority")
instituted a new program 5 intended to regain control of Chicago's
* I am grateful to Professor David Thomas for his encouragement and patience during the
development of this Note. The editorial contributions of J. Russell McFarlane and Kathleen J.
Getty were invaluable: thanks to Rusty for disbelieving all my arguments and encouraging me
to convince you, and thanks to Kathy for having the patience and initiative that I lacked. The
1992-93 staff and editors of the Chicago-Kent Law Review will never adequately receive the
honor they deserve for their perseverance in the face of an overwhelming task. I will always be
inspired by their dedication and grateful for their accomplishments in turning adversity into
success. For their leadership and for the camaraderie we shared, I extend special praise to my
fellow board members: Steve, Lesa, Ana, Shawn, Mary, and Mark. But most of all, thanks to
Sally for her immeasurable tolerance, infinite patience, and unwavering support over the past
four years.
1. Camilo C. Vergara, Hell in a Very Tall Place; Conditions in New York City Public Hous-
ing Projects, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 1989, at 72. But see Zay N. Smith, In a World of Death, Kids
Sing About 'Living in Hell', CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, at 29 (describing Cabrini-Green
children's song "Living Here Is Like Living In Hell").
2. Thomas Moore et al., Dead Zones, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 10, 1989, at 20.
3. For a moving account of two boys struggling to grow up in Chicago's Henry Homer
Homes, see ALEX KoTLowrrz, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE (1991). For a historical and
sociological account of movement from Mississippi sharecropping farms to Chicago ghettos, in-
cluding the Robert Taylor Homes, see NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND (1991).
4. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987), for a candid and
nondogmatic exploration of the social trauma of the inner city.
5. The idea, however, is not so new. In the 1960s, welfare officials conducted mass night-
time or early morning raids on the homes of welfare recipients in hopes of discovering an unau-
thorized "man in the house." See Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social
Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963); see also Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 425 P.2d 223 (Cal.
1967) (social worker seeking reinstatement after being discharged for refusing to participate in
"Operation Bedcheck" raids).
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public housing projects from the drug dealers and gangs who had
come to control them. Under "Operation Clean Sweep," CHA offi-
cials and Chicago police officers would cordon off a target building,
restricting access to a single entrance. Teams of officials and police
would conduct door-to-door searches through apartments, seeking out
evidence of drug trafficking and removing unauthorized residents.
Unsafe and unsanitary building conditions would be noted and repair
teams dispatched. Residents would be issued identification cards,
which would thereafter be necessary to pass the guards posted round-
the-clock in the lobby to screen and restrict visitors.
The "sweeps" quickly entered the vocabulary and the conscious-
ness of the city. Tales of thankful residents praising the CHA for do-
ing something to improve the projects fought for space in the
newspapers with horror stories of abuses6 perpetrated during the
sweeps. After the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") filed
suit7 against the CHA, the police department, and the city on behalf
of aggrieved residents, the CHA cut back on some of the more aggres-
sive "paramilitary" tactics as part of a consent decree.
8
The program, meanwhile, had garnered national attention. Jack
Kemp, the former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development,
praised the CHA's efforts as a model for other cities. Sweep pro-
grams were considered or instituted in Atlanta,9 Baltimore,10 Boston,
6. Some alleged abuses arising out of the sweeps have not made the papers. In Herring v.
Chicago Housing Authority, No. 90-C-3797 (N.D. Ill., amended complaint filed Dec. 6, 1990), a
resident claims the CHA evicted her in retaliation for holding a meeting to organize a protest of
the sweep program, that the CHA, in its eviction notice, termed "aiding and conducting a sub-
versive meeting against C.H.A." Exhibit B, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, Herring (No.
90-L-3797). The complaint also alleges that two CHA managers told Mrs. Herring that she was
"in trouble ... for signing in communists" and that "CHA tenants are not allowed to protest
against CHA." Id. at 5.
Another suit against the CHA is tangentially related to the sweeps. In Turner v. Chicago
Housing Authority, No. 89-C-5801, 1990 WL 104113 (N.D. I11. July 3, 1990), the plaintiffs were
challenging a CHA policy of evicting residents from public housing because of crimes committed
outside the apartment by relatives who do not live with them. The Turners claim that, during the
pendency of the case, the CHA searched their apartment as part of a purported sweep. The
magistrate found that the search had, in fact, been in retaliation for the filing of the suit, and
ordered the CHA to give four days written notice to the Turners before entering other than in a
bona fide emergency. Turner v. Chicago Housing Authority, No. 89-C-5801, 1990 WL 104113
(N.D. I11. July 3, 1990).
7. Summeries v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 88-C-10566 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 1988).
8. Neal R. Peirce, Putting Public Housing in Social Order, WASH. POST, June 8, 1991, at
F3.
9. In Atlanta, police set up roadblocks at the entrances to public housing projects and
stopped all persons entering or leaving. Ron Harris, Blacks Feel Brunt of Drug War, L.A. TIMds,
Apr. 22, 1990, § 1, at 1.
10. USA TODAY, Oct. 11, 1990, at 6A.
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Newark, Philadelphia," Nashville, Detroit, Seattle, Des Moines,12 An-
napolis, and Marquette, Michigan.'
3
For three years the CHA sweeps continued irregularly, substan-
tially within the terms of the consent decree. In October of 1992, the
killing of a seven-year-old boy on his way to school at Cabrini-Green 14
shocked the city. In response, the CHA reinstituted an even more
aggressive sweep program, reigniting the litigation between the CHA
and the ACLU15 and again raising the issue of the legitimacy of the
sweeps.
The CHA admits that some of the sweep tactics are illegal.' 6
However, the legitimacy of Operation Clean Sweep has not been liti-
gated beyond the District Court.' 7 This Note, therefore, examines the
question of whether these sweeps are constitutionally permissible. In
doing so, this Note explores a broader issue of the extent to which the
choice of theoretical framework determines the answer to this ques-
tion, and attempts to predict how the Supreme Court would use its
own precedents to determine the constitutionality of public housing
sweeps.
Part I describes the manner in which the CHA has conducted
these sweeps and the litigation which has arisen from it. Part II
presents two conflicting methods of analysis, both of which fit the
facts of the sweeps, but would likely result in opposite outcomes. Part
II A describes a line of reasoning based on the concept of the tradi-
tional protections afforded to the home. Part II B describes a con-
trasting line of reasoning based on the concept of the sweep as an
administrative search program. Part III applies each of these models
to the facts of the sweep program and predicts the likely outcome.
Part III A demonstrates that under the "home" model, the sweep pro-
11. Proposal to "Seal Off' Projects is Part of a National Trend, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 16,
1991, at 6.
12. Gwen Ifill, Kemp Quarterbacks a Drug Fight, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1989, at A17.
13. See Proposal to "Seal Off' Projects is Part of a National Trend, supra note 11.
14. Matthew Nickerson, Fatal Walk to School, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 1992, § 1, at 1.
15. See Motion to Modify Consent Decree, Summeries v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 88-C-
10566 (N.D. Il1. Oct. 30, 1992) [hereinafter Motion to Modify Consent Decree]; Plaintiff's Mo-
tion for Rule to Show Cause Why Defendants CHA, Lane, Rodriguez and City of Chicago
Should not be Held in Contempt for Noncompliance with Consent Decree, Summeries (No. 88-
C-10566) (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 1992) [hereinafter Motion to Show Cause].
16. Maudlyne Ihejirika, CHA Sweep Illegal, Cops Admit, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Aug. 19, 1993, at
1.
17. As this Note was going to press, U.S. District Court Judge Wayne Andersen issued a
temporary restraining order prohibiting the CHA from searching a tenant's apartment without
either consent or probable cause to believe that a crime has occurred. Matt O'Connor, Judge
Blocks CHA Sweeps for Weapons, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 1994, § 2, at 1.
1993]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
gram is clearly constitutionally impermissible. Part III B demon-
strates that the "administrative" model requires a more involved
analysis, allowing the motivation of the court to influence the outcome
in either direction. Finally, Part IV concludes with suggestions for a
sweep program which either viewpoint would find constitutionally ac-
ceptable while rendering the assistance that residents of public hous-
ing so desperately need.
I. THE SWEEP PROGRAM
The CHA first executed "Operation Clean Sweep" on September
20, 1988.18 As the sweeps were initially performed, CHA officials and
Chicago police, in unannounced, 19 mid-morning20 raids, would barri-
cade the building.21 Residents who tried to leave were threatened
with arrest.22 Residents who were allowed to enter were subjected to
searches of their persons and parcels.23 Other residents were forbid-
den entrance for lack of identification. 24
Meanwhile, CHA officials and Chicago police would go door-to-
door through the building.25 The officials, lacking warrants, entered
apartments without consent26 to search for drugs, guns, and unauthor-
ized residents.27 The scope of the searches included looking through
closets and shoeboxes, 28 under couch cushions, and in the freezer.29
In one instance, a resident alleged that the officials picked the lock on
her bedroom door to gain entry and search through the clothing in her
dresser drawers.30
18. Jorge Casuso, Sweeps Returning Hope to CHA Residents, CHI. Tju., Sept. 17, 1989, § 2,
at 1.
19. Diane Geraghty, CHA's Sweep Searches Went Too Far, CHI. TRn., Jan. 4, 1989, § 4
(Perspective), at 14.
20. See 7 Arrested in Sweep at Cabrini, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7, 1988, § 2, at 13.
21. Ronald Henkoff, Can Business Save Public Housing?, FORTUNE, Nov. 20, 1989, at 121.
22. Plaintiff's Complaint at 10, Summeries v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 88-C-10566 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 16, 1988).
23. Id. at 10, 14.
24. See id. at 10-11 (plaintiff's daughter, arriving home after school, was forced to remain
outside in Chicago winter conditions).
25. Henkoff, supra note 21, at 122.
26. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 12, Summeries (No. 88-C-10566).
27. Sheri T. Prasso, Housing Boss Squeezing Thugs out of Projects, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27,
1989, § 1, at 4.
28. Plaintiff's Complaint at 12, Summeries (No. 88-C-10566).
29. Id. at 13.
30. Id. at 13-14. According to the Plaintiff's Complaint, the resident locked her bedroom
door "to keep her children out and to keep her cat out and maintain her privacy." Id. at 13.
[Vol. 69:505
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After a building was swept, residents were issued identification
cards to allow them entry to their homes.31 Guards were posted in the
lobby to maintain twenty-four hour access control.32 A new visitation
policy was instituted, requiring residents to go to the lobby of the
building to sign in visitors, who were themselves required to present
photographic identification.33 Under the policy, no visitors were al-
lowed to remain in the building after midnight.34 In one instance, a
resident who normally babysat while her sister worked was forced to
remove the children from the building at midnight.35
As might be expected, the ACLU filed a suit challenging these
policies on behalf of the tenants.36 A consent decree was subse-
quently entered into by the ACLU, the CHA, and the City of Chi-
cago.37 As part of the decree, a less restrictive visitation policy38 and
more restrictive guidelines for the conduct of sweeps 39 were imple-
mented by the CHA.
A. Visitation Policy
Under the Visitation Policy, residents are allowed to have visitors
at any hour.4° Visitors are required to identify themselves to the lobby
guards and sign in, but they need not prove their identity.41 If a resi-
dent notifies the lobby guard in advance of the name and estimated
arrival time of a visitor, that visitor is to be admitted immediately.42 If
a visitor is unexpected, the lobby guard is to notify the resident "as
31. Peirce, supra note 8, at F3.
32. Henkoff, supra note 21, at 122.
33. Plaintiff's Complaint at 12, Summeries (No. 88-C-10566).
34. Id. at 11.
35. Id. at 12-13.
36. Summeries v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 88-C-10566 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 1988); see also
Geraghty, supra note 19.
37. Consent Decree, Summeries v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 88-C-10566 (N.D. Ill ordered
Nov. 30, 1989) [hereinafter Consent Decree]. For a discussion of the legal significance of consent
decrees, see generally Symposium, Consent Decrees: Practical Problems and Legal Dilemmas,
1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1. For a recent Supreme Court decision affecting the modifiability of
consent decrees, see Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992).
38. Appendix A (Visitation Policy) to Consent Decree, Summeries (No. 88-C-10566) [here-
inafter Visitation Policy].
39. Appendix B (Chicago Housing Authority Emergency Housing Inspection Guidelines)
to Consent Decree, Summeries (No. 88-C-10566) [hereinafter Inspection Guidelines].
40. Visitation Policy, supra note 38, at 3.
41. The Visitation Policy states: "The guest upon entry to a CHA building will identify
himself to CHA personnel. While CHA personnel may request that a guest provide independent
verification (by printed I.D. or otherwise) of the guest's identity, no guest shall be required to





promptly as possible"43 of the visitor's identity, and to admit the visi-
tor upon confirmation from the tenant. 4 Visitors who stay longer
than twenty-four hours are, at the request of the tenant, to be issued
"Guest" cards, allowing free entry and exit.
45
B. Inspection Guidelines
The Inspection Guidelines characterize the sweep as an "emer-
gency housing inspection." 46 The avowed purposes of inspections
under the guidelines are to "remove and identify unauthorized occu-
pants" 47 and to "inspect the condition of the units.
'48
A sweep is triggered by "reasonable cause to believe that there is
an immediate threat to the safety and/or welfare of tenants and/or
employees and/or business invitees and/or property of the CHA.
' '49
This determination is to be made, in writing, by the Chief Executive
Officer of the CHA.50 Under the terms of the Inspection Guidelines
and the standard lease, no prior notice is required before a sweep is
conducted. 51 However, the CHA is required to set up an "operations
center" 52 on the grounds of the building being swept, complete with
heating, cooling, and toilet facilities.
53
The Inspection Guidelines direct CHA staff to conduct a struc-
tural inspection of the apartment.54 This inspection is directed at ob-
43. Id.
44. Id. As part of the policy, the CHA is required to use its "best efforts" to provide a
mechanism for prompt communication with residents. Id. at 1-2.
45. Id. at 2-3. Visitors are allowed to stay up to two weeks, id. at 3; the Visitation Policy
does not specify how visitors for longer periods are to be handled.
46. Inspection Guidelines, supra note 39, at 1.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. This may be a description of everyday life in the projects.
50. Id. At the time of the consent decree, the CEO of the CHA was Vince Lane. Id.
51. The Inspection Guidelines specify "[Niothing in these guidelines shall modify the ten-
ants' right to appropriate notice as set forth in Paragraph 12(a) [of the CHA lease]." Inspection
Guidelines, supra note 39, at 1. The CHA lease at that time stated
12. (a) Management shall, upon reasonable advance notification to the Tenant, be
permitted to enter the dwelling unit during reasonable hours for the purpose of per-
forming routine inspections and maintenance, for making improvements or repairs, or
to show the premises for re-leasing. A written statement specifying the purpose of the
Management entry delivered to the premises at least two days before such entry shall
be considered reasonable advance notification. (b) Management may enter the prem-
ises at any time without advance notification when there is a reasonable cause to be-
lieve that an emergency exists.
Exhibit A in Appendix B of Consent Decree, Sunmeries v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 88-C-
10566 (N.D. Ill., ordered Nov. 30, 1989) [hereinafter CHA Lease]. Since a sweep is categorized
as an "emergency inspection," I 12(b) would appear to apply and no notice would be required.
52. Inspection Guidelines, supra note 39, at 2.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 6.
[Vol. 69:505
CLEAN SWEEP OR WITCH HUNT?
serving the "condition of floors, ceilings, walls, electrical wiring,
heating sources, windows, window frames, doors, locks, and equip-
ment and/or appliances of the CHA"155 and detecting "unsafe, hazard-
ous or unsanitary conditions. ' ' 56 During this process, the CHA staff is
instructed "not to in any way inspect or in any way harm or injure...
the person or personal effects of any individual"57 unless necessary to
perform the inspection.
58
Non-residents59 discovered in an apartment with a tenant during
a sweep are allowed to stay upon request by the tenant and upon the
visitor identifying himself or herself to CHA staff.60 Non-residents
found in apartments where no tenant is present, or in common areas,
are removed to the operations center.61 There, they may be processed
as a visitor or may request to be added to the lease.
62
During a sweep, Chicago police personnel are not allowed to
enter apartments or conduct searches "in the absence of independent
legal justification." 63 They may be present at the site to provide police
protection for the staff.64 However, the terms of the Inspection
Guidelines do not forbid CHA police personnel, who have full police
powers, from participating in a sweep.65 Furthermore, the Inspection
Guidelines expressly allow "reporting [by CHA staff of] what appears
to be a violation of the law, or any unlawful or criminal activity"
66
discovered during the sweep.
55. Id. at 6-7.
56. Id. at 7.
57. Id.
58. Id. The Inspection Guidelines, in apparent response to the charges in the original com-
plaint, further specifies "CHA staff may not examine the personal property of CHA tenants or
their guests, or the contents of such property, including: bureau or dresser drawers; closets; bed
clothes; clothing; boxes; or other containers, or the like." Id.
59. Excepting babysitters and their charges or "ill or infirm" persons, id at 3, unless "exi-
gent circumstances" exist. Id.
60. Id. at 3-4. As with the Visitation Policy, no verification of identity is required. See Visita-
tion Policy, supra note 38, at 1.
61. Inspection Guidelines, supra note 39, at 3, 8. The non-resident may alternately leave the
premises entirely. Id. at 3.
62. Id. at 4.
63. Id. at 9.
64. Id. at 8.
65. See id. at 8-9. Between the time of the initial sweeps and the agreement to the consent
decree, the Illinois Legislature granted to the CHA the authority to "establish, appoint and
support a police force." See An Act relating to Housing Authorities, No. 86-457 (1988 Ill. Laws
2802-04) (codified at 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/8.1a (1993)). Members of such a police force
have the same powers, including arrest powers, as the members of city and county police and
sheriffs departments. Id. Since the consent decree, the CHA has indeed created its own force,
which is not covered by the Inspection Guidelines exclusion of Chicago police personnel. See
Inspection Guidelines, supra note 39, at 8-9; William Recktenwald, 2 Are Charged, 1 Sought in
Slaying of CHA Cop, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 9, 1991, § 1, at 8.
66. Inspection Guidelines, supra note 39, at 9.
1993]
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C. Modifications to the Decree
On October 13, 1992, seven-year-old Dantrell Davis was walking
to school in the Cabrini-Green project. A few feet from the school
door, in view of his mother, his classmates, his teachers, and Chicago
police officers, he was killed by a single rifle shot to the head.67
The murder of Dantrell Davis shocked the city. In response, the
CHA mounted the most concentrated sweep since the creation of the
program. CHA police and inspectors, Chicago police, and agents of
the FBI, DEA, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
searched apartments, vacant and occupied, for guns and drugs.68 The
chairman of the CHA suggested calling in the National Guard as rein-
forcements. 69 All residents leaving the building were subjected to pat-
down searches.70 The CHA began removing residents from some of
the high-rise buildings in preparation for vacating and sealing the
buildings.71 After ten days, the CHA had swept twenty-nine of thirty-
one buildings at Cabrini, closing and sealing four of them, arresting
forty-four persons, and seizing four firearms.72
The CHA also moved to expand the scope of the sweep program
by seeking a modification of the consent decree.73 The consent decree
permitted the CHA to require that visitors to CHA buildings sign in
prior to admittance. 74 The CHA sought to expand this authority to
require these visitors to provide photographic identification. 75 The
CHA also sought authority to install metal detectors at the entrance
of each building and to require all persons, residents and visitors alike,
to pass through the detectors prior to admittance. 7
6
More disturbingly, the CHA sought expansive powers directly
implicating the text of the Fourth Amendment. The CHA asked for
67. Nickerson, supra note 14.
68. Scott Fornek & Tom Seible, Cabrini Sweep Under Way, CHI. SUN-TimEs, Oct. 21, 1992,
at 4; Jennifer Lenhart, Cabrini Cleanup Begins, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 1992, at 4.
69. See Scott Fomek & Fran Spielman, Send National Guard to Cabrini, Lane Says, CHI.
S N-TIMES, Oct. 16, 1992, at 5.
70. Sweep Continues at Cabrini, CHI. SUN-TiMEs, Oct. 22, 1992, at 1.
71. Mayor Presents CHA Peace Plan, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Oct. 20, 1992, at 1; Lenhart, supra
note 68, at 4.
72. See Tom Seibel & Fran Spielman, Truce, Cabrini Sweeps Open Way for Optimism, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Oct. 30, 1992, at 26. Neither Dantrell Davis' killer nor the gun used were found in
the sweeps; the suspect in the crime, who confessed after his arrest, was located after CHA
residents identified him to police. See Tim Gerber, Suspect Confessed, Police Say, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1992, at 5.
73. See Motion to Modify Consent Decree, supra note 15.
74. Visitation Policy, supra note 38, at 1.
75. Motion to Modify Consent Decree, supra note 15, at 4.
76. Id.
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the power to conduct searches, "including physical pat-down
searches," without cause, of any visitors entering any CHA building.77
Further, whereas the consent decree restricted apartment searches to
visual inspections of unoccupied units,78 the CHA sought the power to
search occupied units as well. 79 Moreover, such searches would not be
limited to mere visual inspections, but would extend to searches of
any persons in those occupied units and their personal effects. 80
In response to the intensity of the sweeps at Cabrini-Green, the
ACLU sought to have the CHA declared in contempt of court for
violating the consent decree.81 The ACLU's motion documented in-
stances in which the CHA had already implemented the sweep proce-
dures that the CHA was seeking to have added to its powers under
the consent decree. According to the ACLU's motion, the CHA was
already requiring visitors to produce photographic identification 82 and
residents to pass through metal detectors.83 Moreover, CHA police
were already conducting pat-down searches of residents and visitors84
and searching personal effects and apartments. 85
At the time of the writing of this Note, the litigation between the
CHA and the ACLU continues. Meanwhile, the CHA continues to
sweep its buildings,86 and the debate over the legitimacy of the pro-
gram continues. 87
II. CHOOSING A LEGAL PARADIGM
8 8
The legality of the CHA sweep program is an issue that illustrates
a conflict between two distinct lines of thought in Fourth Amendment
77. Id.
78. See Inspection Guidelines, supra note 39, at 6.
79. Motion to Modify Consent Decree, supra note 15, at 5.
80. Id.
81. Motion to Show Cause, supra note 15.
82. Id. at 11-12.
83. Id at 7.
84. One resident was searched seven times and another nine times in one day. Id. at 4.
Male officers conducted pat-down searches of female tenants. Id. at 4-5. CHA police searched
children ranging in age from two months to six years old. Id. at 5-6; The Jerry Springer Show
(WMAQ-TV television broadcast, Nov. 3, 1992).
85. CHA police searched grocery bags, handbags, diaper bags, and baby strollers. Motion
to Show Cause, supra note 15, at 7. They also searched dresser drawers, closets and in one
instance a locked bedroom. Id. at 7.
86. See Cleaning the Apartments, CHI. TRIa., Jan. 7, 1993, § 2, at 3.
87. See Ihejirika, supra note 16.
88. In the sense used in THOMAS KuHN, THE STRUCrURE OF SCIENTIC REVOLTONS (2d
ed. 1970), a paradigm is "a constellation of subtle institutions and beliefs surrounding any
dominating example of successful scientific research." David Warsh, From 'NP' to 'PC':
Understanding the Structure of Differing World Views, CHI. TRm., Dec. 30, 1990, at 7D.
Similarly, a legal paradigm would be the institutions and beliefs surrounding a dominating
19931
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jurisprudence. On the one hand, a public housing apartment is much
like any private apartment. From this viewpoint (the "Home Para-
digm"), the legality of the sweep program would be analyzed by stud-
ying the series of Supreme Court decisions involving searches of the
home.89 On the other hand, the sweep program is similar to adminis-
trative search programs which have engendered an entirely different
line of Supreme Court decisions (the "Administrative Reasonableness
Paradigm"). 9° Two recent cases, decided the same year by the same
Court, illustrate how the choice of analytic model9' establishes the di-
rection taken by the Court's reasoning, and thus effectively deter-
mines the outcome. In Minnesota v. Olson, 92 a suspect in a robbery-
murder was traced to the apartment of a girlfriend, where he had been
staying. Police entered the apartment without a warrant and arrested
Olson. The Court, in a 7-2 decision, held the arrest to be illegal93 and
therefore suppressed a confession made to the arresting officers. 94
Following the Home Paradigm, the Court grounded the outcome in
the determination that Olson's status as an overnight guest gave him
an expectation of privacy, as in one's own home, that society was pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable. Thus, under the Home Paradigm,
the importance given the protection of the home from illegal intrusion
forced the Court to allow an admittedly guilty defendant to escape by
shielding himself behind the Fourth Amendment.
95
In contrast, the Court followed the Administrative Reasonable-
ness Paradigm in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz. 9 6 Sitz
example of legal analysis. See Lawrence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What
Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989), for a paradigmatic study
of currents of constitutional thought. For a popular use (or misuse) of the concept, see, for
example, Lance Morrow, Old Paradigm, New Paradigm, TIME, Jan. 14, 1991, at 65.
89. See infra notes 99-119 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 128-211 and accompanying text.
91. Cf. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964).
Packer presents two contrasting value systems, Due Process Values and Crime Control Values,
which illustrate conflicting trends in criminal law. Id. at 9-22. The "Home Paradigm" seems to
encompass many of the Due Process Values, while the "Administrative Reasonableness Para-
digm" would be consistent with Crime Control Values.
92. 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990).
93. See id. at 1684.
94. The Court forcefully suggested, by citing the companion case of New York v. Harris, 110
S. Ct. 1640 (1990), that Minnesota had missed an opportunity by not raising the issue of whether
Olson's subsequent admissions were also tainted by the illegality of the arrest. Olson, 110 S. Ct.
at 1684 n.2. In Harris, with virtually identical facts, the Court held that, while the exclusionary
rule required suppression of admissions made by Harris in his home, the rule did not require
suppression of statements by Harris at the police station, as the taint of the illegal in-home arrest
dissipated once he was removed from his home. Harris, 110 S. Ct. at 1640.
95. Olson, 110 S. Ct. at 1686-88.
96. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
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involved a sobriety checkpoint program where all cars, without any
suspicion of wrongdoing, were stopped for investigation. Since the
checkpoints were operated pursuant to guidelines on site selection
and checkpoint operation, the Court held them (in a 6-3 decision) to
be a "reasonable" method of dealing with the problem of detecting
drunken drivers and to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
97
The existence of administrative guidelines was sufficient to make the
roadblocks constitutionally acceptable, even though the burden fell
equally without suspicion upon the population at large. Thus, under
the Administrative Reasonableness Paradigm, the Court relied on
procedural regularity to justify excluding the admittedly innocent ma-
jority of the public from the protection of the Fourth Amendment.98
A. The Home Paradigm
Among the shrinking protections99 granted by the Fourth
Amendment, 1°° the inviolability of the home has been uniquely pro-
tected by the Supreme Court.101 The historical continuity' °2 of this
97. See id. at 2484.
98. See Robert L. Misner, Justifying Searches on the Basis of Equality of Treatment, 82 J.
CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 547 (1991), for a discussion of this increasing trend.
99. See, e.g., Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 257 (1984).
100. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
101. The language used by the Court in discussing the security of the home reveals little
room for doubt as to the firmness of their stance: "[Plhysical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed .... United States v. United
States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). "The Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights
which it secures, have a long history. At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into
his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may
be frail-its roof may shake-the wind may blow through it-the storm may enter, the
rain may enter-but the King of England cannot enter-all his force dares not cross the
threshold of the ruined tenement.
William Pitt, quoted in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 n.31 (1982); Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 601 n.54 (1980); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 378 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing), overruled by Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Miller v. United States, 357
U.S. 301, 307 (1958).
102. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 714-15 (1984); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 32-33 (1925); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See also Entick v. Carrington,
19 Howell St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
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legacy remains at the forefront of the conscience of the Court. 103 As
the form of privacy' ° 4 most jealously guarded against official intru-
sion, this protection is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty"' 05
and a fundamental component of due process. 0 6
The practical result of this tradition is that warrantless searches
and seizures in the home are presumptively unreasonable. 0 7 Thus,
the government has the burden of demonstrating that a search or
seizure in the home, absent neutral judicial scrutiny, is reasonable. 08
A few carefully circumscribed exceptions have been carved from this
rule: the doctrines of plain view,109 hot pursuit, 1 0 exigent circum-
stances,"' and general emergency. 112 The Court has generally been
unwilling to expand these categories, 1 3 thus reflecting a view that the
right to the privacy of the home is nearly unconditional.1 4
103. The [Fourth] Amendment reflects the recognition of the Framers that certain en-
claves should be free from arbitrary government interference.... [T]he Court since the
enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed "the overriding respect for the sanc-
tity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the
Republic."
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601
(1980)).
104. As stated in Katz v. United States, "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). It is the social and psychological aspects of "home-ness" which are
protected. See Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1984). Cf. Margaret Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (linking personhood with the idea of the home); Mar-
garet Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 350, 358-365 (1986) (use of property
as a home is better justification for special protection than whether owned or rented).
105. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)).
106. See id. at 27-28.
107. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987) (Scalia, J.).
108. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48, 51 (1951); United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971)). But cf. Jones v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir.
1989) (in civil rights action claiming warrantless search was unreasonable, plaintiff bears burden
of proving prima facie case).
109. See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1982).
110. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 298-300 (1967).
111. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (distinguishing police need to respond to
gunfire from police need to subsequently investigate the crime).
112. The classic "emergency" situation is the entry of firemen to extinguish a fire. See Michi-
gan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984) (boarding up house after fire reestablished expectation of
privacy).
113. Unlike the Administrative Reasonableness Paradigm. See infra notes 128-211 and ac-
companying text.
114. Such protections have been categorized as absolute constraints on the pursuit of social
utility, or alternately, as Kantian as opposed to utilitarian. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L.
COLEMAN, PILOSOP1Y OF LAw: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (rev. ed. 1990).
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Furthermore, the Court has shown a willingness to expand the
protections afforded the home to areas used in a similar fashion. 115
Thus, the Fourth Amendment protection of the home has been
granted to hotel and motel rooms,116 rented dwellings, 117 rooming
houses,118 and overnight guest lodgings. 119
Searches of the person also have been traditionally regarded as
presumptively unreasonable. 120 Outside of the custodial arrest situa-
tion, 21 the police may stop a person for questioning only if the officer
has individualized, reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in
criminal activity. 122 Only if the officer has a reasonable belief that the
suspect is "armed and presently dangerous" may the officer search the
suspect, and then only to determine if in fact the person is armed.123
The officer may remove from the person of the suspect only objects
which are obviously (to the officer's "plain feel") weapons or
contraband. 24
B. The Administrative Reasonableness Paradigm
In contrast to the near-absolute protection granted to the home,
the Court's administrative search jurisprudence has been more a di-
rection than a doctrine.'2 5 While it is easy to predict what the Court
115. Thus demonstrating that it is not the physical, but the psychological place, that is pro-
tected. See supra note 104.
116. E.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Johnson v, United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17
(1948).
117. E.g., Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610,
613 (1961).
118. E.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
119. Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990). The Court has apparently drawn the line at
motor homes. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1986).
120. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2139-40 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
121. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
122. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
123. ld. at 24.
124. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2136-37; Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94
(1979).
In a concurring opinion to Dickerson, Justice Scalia suggests that the common-law doctrine
by which the intent of the Framers should be measured would hold that the suspicionless stop
would be permissible, but that a warrantless search, absent an arrest, would not be permissible.
Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2140.
125. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public,
1989 Sup. Cr. REv. 87, 107.
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will do in these cases, 126 it is not so easy to uncover the principles
underlying their decisions. 127
1. Birth of the Administrative Search Doctrine
The Administrative Reasonableness Paradigm began with the
birth of the "administrative search" doctrine in Camara v. Municipal
Court.128 A San Francisco housing inspector, performing a routine an-
nual inspection of an apartment building, was informed by the land-
lord that Camara was living in the rear of the building, in apparent
violation of the building code. Camara refused to allow the building
inspector to enter his apartment without a warrant. He was ultimately
charged with a misdemeanor for interfering with the attempted in-
spection and arrested.
129
The Supreme Court held that a warrant was required for adminis-
trative searches. 130 However, in rejecting Camara's argument that the
standard for issuance of the warrant should be "probable cause," the
Court created the so-called "administrative search" doctrine and laid
the groundwork for the development of the lower "reasonableness"
standard for Fourth Amendment intrusions.
The Court rejected the argument that the lack of suspicion of
criminal behavior allowed a lower level of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. As the Court put it, "even the most law-abiding citizen has a
very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the
sanctity of his home may be broken by official authority.' 3' The
Court also rejected the City's argument that requiring that the inspec-
tion be performed "reasonabl[y]" provided a safeguard which elimi-
nated the need for individualized review of the reasonableness of the
inspector's decision to enter.13
2
Nevertheless, the Court recognized that a traditional "probable
cause" standard would be unworkable in the building inspection situa-
tion. Given the hidden nature of building code violations, it would be
126. "The Court has upheld nearly all the administrative searches it has considered since
1980 and has often gone out of its way to contemplate standards even less restrictive than those
that had been satisfied on the facts before it." Id
127. See id. ("a Court fundamentally in disarray"). Cf. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE
BUSH 12 (2d ed. 1951) ("What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.").
128. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
129. Id. at 527.
130. Id. at 540.
131. Id. at 530-31.
132. Id. at 532 n.10. See id. at 533 ("[B]road statutory safeguards are no substitute for indi-
vidualized review, particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of a crimi-
nal penalty.").
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virtually impossible for the government to discover them through
traditional investigatory means.133 Thus, in determining whether the
Fourth Amendment intrusion of a building inspection would be "rea-
sonable," the Court set forth a balancing test: the need to search,
made up of the public interest at stake and the necessity of the
method involved, would be weighed against the invasion which the
search entailed. 134 In the city-wide inspection situation of Camara,
the public interest in ensuring compliance with building codes, com-
bined with the government's need to use the method of area inspec-
tions as the only effective means of enforcing the code, 35 could
outweigh the private interest in avoiding the search and thus be "rea-
sonable" under the Fourth Amendment. 136 The requirement for issu-
ance of a warrant, therefore, was not "probable cause." For an
administrative inspection, a warrant could issue if "reasonable legisla-
tive or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are
satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling."' 37 This standard re-
quired no specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwell-
ing, but did require the presence of some reasonable, predetermined
factors which would give rise to a suspicion that building code viola-
tions were likely to be present. 38 Thus, even under the lower stan-
dard of suspicion in Camara, some indication that the search would be
reasonably likely to be productive was required.
Later administrative search cases eliminated the need for a war-
rant in certain circumscribed cases. In cases such as United States v.
Biswell,139 Donovan v. Dewey, 40 and New York v. Burger,14' the
Court created the closely-regulated industry exception to the require-
ment for administrative search warrants. Under the Court's reason-
ing, choosing to participate in industries which are subject to
"pervasive" regulation by the government provides an almost con-
structive notice of the possibility of random searches not based upon
probable cause. In effect, the government and public interest in the
conduct of participants in these industries is substantial enough to out-
133. Id. at 537.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 538.
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (justifying less-than-full-blown searches and
seizures upon the presence of objective facts reasonably indicating the likelihood of a suspect's
being armed and dangerous).
139. 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (gun dealers).
140. 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (mining industry).
141. 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (auto dismantlers).
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weigh the invasion of individual privacy. In other industries which
were not "closely-regulated," however, the Court continued to uphold
the requirement of a warrant. 142
2. Special Needs to the Fore
The "watershed"'143 in the expansion of the administrative search
doctrine, and the defining case in the Administrative Reasonableness
Paradigm, was New Jersey v. T.L.O.144 Before T.L.O., administrative
searches were categorized as special situations in which the general
standard of probable cause could be relaxed. "Reasonableness" was
merely the standard to be applied in those exceptional cases where
probable cause was not appropriate for reasons of practicality or
where constructive consent to intrusion was present. T.L.O. turned
these standards inside out by defining "reasonableness," and not
probable cause, as the general standard for justifying a Fourth
Amendment intrusion.145 Whereas "probable cause" required the
probability of a violation to be established before permitting an intru-
sion, thus implying that government needs must overcome privacy in-
terests, "reasonableness" gives government needs and privacy
interests the same weight, balancing them to determine whether the
intrusion was justified. 4 As an afterthought, the former requirement
of "probable cause" was relegated to a mere special case of
reasonableness. 147
The standard of reasonableness set forth in T.L.O. was comprised
of two factors. 148 The first factor was whether the action was "justi-
fied at its inception."'1 49 A search would be justified if there were
"reasonable grounds" for suspecting that it would turn up evidence of
a violation.' 50 Thus, some suspicion of wrongdoing was still required.
The second factor in "reasonableness" was whether the scope of the
142. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (warrant required for OSHA inspec-
tion due to absence of "long tradition of close government supervision").
143. Schulhofer, supra note 125, at 99.
144. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
145. Id. at 337.
146. Schulhofer, supra note 125, at 100.
147. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
148. Id. at 341-42.
149. 1I at 342.
150. Id. The Court also laid the groundwork for future expansion of this justification by
explicitly refusing to decide whether the suspicion of wrongdoing was required to be an individu-
alized suspicion. Id. at 342 n.9.
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search (e.g., the methodology employed) was "reasonably related" to
the intrusion caused and the "nature of the infraction." 151
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion provided the catchphrase
by which the Court subsequently bypassed the need for probable
cause or warrants. Derived from the principle that administrative
searches do not require probable cause because they do not implicate
criminal liability,152 the T.L.O. "special needs"'153 qualification, on its
face, restricted the applicability of the "reasonableness" standard to
situations other than traditional law enforcement. As used by the
Court, however, the qualification expanded to include all Fourth
Amendment invasions other than those directly related to traditional
law enforcement procedures.' 54
O'Connor v. Ortega 55 continued in the direction indicated by
T.L.O. In Ortega, however, the suspicion of wrongdoing was more
nebulous than in T.L.O. Ortega, a psychiatrist employed by the gov-
ernment, was suspected of improprieties in his management of a hos-
pital residency program. While he was on administrative leave,
officials of the hospital searched his office and seized personal items.
The Court remanded the case for a determination of the justification
of the search and seizure.156 The Court stated that if the intrusion had
been for the purpose of securing state property against loss, it would
have been justified. 57 Contrarily, if the search had been for the pur-
pose of investigating Dr. Ortega, it would not have been justified. 58
Thus, Dr. Ortega's individual interest in the privacy of his desk,
though bringing the search within the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection, was counterbalanced and outweighed by the state interest
in retrieving its property.
151. Id. at 342.
152. This principle is not entirely correct. The gun dealer in Biswell was convicted of dealing
in sawed-off shotguns without the necessary license. See Biswell, 406 U.S. 311.
153. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Court's later use of this phrase is a distortion
of Justice Blackmun's point. The entire sentence reads, "Only in those exceptional circumstances
in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impractible, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interest
for that of the Framers." Id. (emphasis added). He further stated, "The Court's implication that
the balancing test is the rule rather than the exception is troubling for me because it is unneces-
sary in this case." Id. at 352.
154. On the Court's use of favorable doctrines to expand the scope of a rule, see John M.
Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of Protection, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1109, 1124 (1989).
155. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
156. Id. at 728-29.
157. Id. at 728.
158. See id. at 727.
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3. Administrative Search of the Home' 59
The Administrative Reasonableness Paradigm and the Home
Paradigm came into conflict in Griffin v. Wisconsin;16 ° the Adminis-
trative Reasonableness Paradigm narrowly won.' 6 ' In Griffin, a Wis-
consin regulation allowed probation officers to search the home of a
probationer without a warrant if they had "reasonable grounds" to
suspect the presence of contraband. 162 The supervisor of Griffin's
probation officer received a tip that Griffin might have guns in his
house. Acting on this information, the supervisor and other officials
searched Griffin's apartment and found a handgun.163
The majority held that the "special needs" of probation out-
weighed the Fourth Amendment protections granted to the home;164
the dissent argued that the protection of the home outweighed the
needs of the probation system.'
65
159. A somewhat confusing pre-T.L.O. case involving the relationship between
administrative needs and Fourth Amendment protections was Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309
(1971). In James, a recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children refused to allow a
home visit by her caseworker, as required by state regulations. Mrs. James challenged the
subsequent termination of her welfare benefits on the grounds that the home visit violated her
rights under the Fourth Amendment. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term-Warrantless
Home Visits to Welfare Recipients, 85 HARV. L. REV. 258, 259 (1971).
The Supreme Court, in Justice Blackmun's first opinion, held that the home visit was not a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. James, 400 U.S. at 318. Furthermore, the
Court held, even if the home visit were a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
it was not an unreasonable search. Id. Still furthermore, even if the search was unreasonable,
the Court held that Mrs. James had waived her right to object by accepting welfare benefits. See
id. at 324.
As commentators have pointed out, James is an anomaly in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The situation in James cannot, in a principled manner, be distinguished from that
of the long-standing precedent of Camara, in which a similar intrusion was held not to be
permissible. See Robert A. Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact
of Wyman v. James, 69 Micii. L. REV. 1259, 1302-03 (1971). It has been suggested that James
was an attempt to avoid examining the politically sensitive issue of the goals of the welfare
system. See Note, supra, at 265. In any event, James has been little applied outside the welfare
recipient-caseworker factual situation, and even proponents of public housing sweeps admit that
James has little relevance to that situation. See Steven Yarosh, Operation Clean Sweep: Is the
Chicago Housing Authority "Sweeping" Away the Fourth Amendment, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1103,
1115 (1992).
160. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
161. By a 5-4 decision. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 868.
162. Id. at 870.
163. Id. at 871.
164. Id at 873.
165. Id. at 883-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' separate dissent (quoted here
in its entirety) demonstrates the cognitive dissonance which occurs when diverging paradigms
are applied to the same facts:
Mere speculation by a police officer that a probationer "may have had" contraband in
his possession is not a constitutionally sufficient basis for a warrantless, nonconsensual
search of a private home. I simply do not understand how five members of this Court
can reach a contrary conclusion. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Id. at 890 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The majority based the reasonableness of the search entirely on
the existence of a governing regulation. 166 The Court discussed the
"special needs" of a probation system 167 to regulate the behavior of
probationers, citing the "ongoing supervisory relationship,"' 68 and
concluded that the regulation fulfilled those needs and thus was
valid.169 Essentially, the regulatory nature of the probation system
brought Griffin within the closely-regulated-industry line of cases. 170
As the dissent pointed out, however, the conduct of the officers in
Griffin did not even meet the standards of reasonabeness required by
the regulation.
17'
4. Elimination of Individualized Suspicion
The Court next eliminated the requirement of predicating
searches upon individualized suspicion, allowing investigative tech-
niques that intrude upon the Fourth Amendment interests of the law-
abiding majority. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n 172 and
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 73 the Court held
that the government's interest in detecting drug use among employ-
ees 174 justified urine testing programs that intruded upon the privacy
of the admittedly innocent majority.
Both Skinner and Von Raab were challenges to programs requir-
ing drug-screening tests for large groups of employees. In Skinner,
railroad employees who were engaged in accidents involving violation
of safety rules were tested; in Von Raab, all applicants for positions
involving carrying firearms or handling "classified" materials were re-
quired to pass a drug-screening test. In both cases, the targeted em-
ployees challenged the testing programs as being without suspicion of
wrongdoing by the subjects of the tests.
166. See id. at 873.
167. Id. at 873-75.
168. Id. at 879.
169. Id. at 875-76.
170. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
171. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 887-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also id. at 880 n.8 ("That the
procedures followed ... may have violated Wisconsin state regulations, is irrelevant to the case
before us.").
172. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
173. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
174. Justice Scalia, who joined with the majority in Skinner, dissented (joined by Justice Ste-
vens, also switching sides) in Von Raab. In Skinner, there was a demonstrated connection be-
tween drug use by railroad employees and accidents. In Von Raab, there was no such
demonstration of drug use or any harm arising from it. In Justice Scalia's view, the program in
Von Raab was merely symbolic, and that "the impairment of individual liberties cannot be the
means of making a point." Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 687 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In both cases, the Court recognized that the tests were significant
intrusions upon individual privacy. Furthermore, the Court recog-
nized that one of the traditional requirements of probable cause, that
there be particularized suspicion that the individual in question com-
mitted the suspected act, was absent. Nevertheless, the Court charac-
terized both cases as "special needs" situations, thus setting the
standard for scrutiny as "reasonableness." Under this standard, the
Court held that the individual interest in privacy was outweighed by
the government and public interests involved. In Skinner, the govern-
ment interest was in maintaining railroad safety, while in Von Raab it
was maintaining physically and morally "fit" personnel in the front
lines of the drug war. Similarly, the public interest in Skinner and Von
Raab was in avoiding the damage which could arguably be caused by
an "impaired" person operating a train or carrying firearms,
respectively. 17
5
Thus, Skinner and Von Raab, taken together, make it easier to
find administrative searches to be "reasonable." Even though a search
of any particular person may turn up nothing-even if such a search is
likely to turn up nothing-the search may be permissible if, in the
aggregate, some search will turn up something. This greatly tips the
balance against the individual; the Court is allowed to aggregate the
government and public interests in the result of the search, yet does
not aggregate the individual intrusions for purposes of comparison.
5. Expansion to Criminal Law Enforcement
In Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 1 7 6 the Court extended
the administrative search doctrine to a field that formerly had been
placed off-limits,' 77 by allowing suspicionless mass seizures for pur-
poses of traditional criminal law enforcement. 78 Sitz upheld the con-
stitutionality of random sobriety checkpoints. 179  At these
175. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656; Skinner, 489 U.S. 602.
176. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
177. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 651 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Von
Raab, 489 U.S. at 664-66.
178. Sobriety roadblocks are set up for the purpose of detecting and arresting drunken driv-
ers. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2484. Such roadblocks are "non-traditional" only in the sense that they
have only been instituted since the Burger-Rehnquist Court began easing restrictions on Fourth
Amendment intrusions. See Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2483, 2491-92 (Michigan program started in 1986;
other states' programs date from the early 1980s).
179. In light of the Court's continued contraction of Fourth Amendment protections, it is
reasonable to assume that Sitz will be a "foot in the door" upon which future expansions of
government intrusions will be found to be permissible. See Junker, supra note 154, at 1109; see,
e.g., United States v. Morales-Zamoran, 914 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding the use of
drug-sniffing dogs during routine license and registration checks on authority of Sitz).
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checkpoints, all motorists travelling upon a selected road are stopped
and checked for signs of intoxication. Motorists suspected of driving
under the influence are pulled aside to be subjected to further testing;
motorists not suspected of being intoxicated are allowed to proceed
after a "brief stop."'180
The Court based its analysis on a balancing test derived from
Brown v. Texas.181 In Brown, the permissibility of a suspicionless stop
was evaluated by "weighing the gravity of the public concerns served
by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public
interest, and the severity of the interference with individual lib-
erty."'18 2 The language of Brown implies that an evaluation of all
three factors is necessary. As the Court applied the test in Sitz, how-
ever, the factors on the state's side are accepted without scrutiny. In
Sitz, the permissibility of a traffic stop was based on the "state's inter-
est in preventing accidents," the "effectiveness" of the method used to
achieve that goal, and the intrusion into the individual's privacy.
83
In Sitz, the Court exhibited difficulty in distinguishing the admit-
tedly similar "state" and "public" interests,184 thus perpetuating con-
fusion that, in other circumstances, may lead to improperly balancing
the relative interests at stake. 185 "Public interest" as used in Sitz in-
volved the. "choice among reasonable alternatives" of enforcement
methods which government officials may make, based upon their
"unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public re-
sources."'1 86 This interest is only indirectly a "public" interest, and is
more properly described as a particularly "state" interest.
The outcome in Sitz was largely predicated upon a "public" inter-
est that was described as a "state" interest: eliminating drunken driv-
180. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2487.
181. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
182. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.
183. Sitz, 110 S. Ct at 2484.
184. In an ideal republic, "government interest" and "public interest" would be synonymous.
While it may be true that the government generally acts in the public interest (and vice versa), it
would be stretching the bounds of credulity to believe that this is always (or never) the case. The
congruence of these interests is especially questionable in cases of government action against a
particular group, rather than an individual. Cf. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 203-04 (4th
Cir. 1966) (ordering injunction against mass suspicionless searches confined to black neighbor-
hoods); see also cases cited infra note 275.
185. Cf. United States v. Richey, 924 F.2d 857, 870 (9th Cir. 1991) (dissenting opinion):
While we must remain aware of the importance of the government's general interest in
nondisclosure and proceed cautiously, where countervailing first amendment interests
exist the Constitution obligates us to look carefully at the particular harm to the indi-
vidual as well as the general harm to first amendment values that would result from
suppression of the specific speech in issue.
186. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2487.
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ers from the highways. The Court cited statistics on "alcohol-related
death and mutilation," 187 lamenting the "tragedy" of the "slaughter"
on the highways.'88 This is not language characterizing interests of the
government in performing its functions; this is a direct appeal to pub-
lic fears of drunken drivers, and to public demands for a solution to
the problem. 189 Framing the issue in such terms made forbidding so-
briety checkpoints appear to be a dereliction of the Court's duty to
the public. 190
Against such a compelling public interest, the intrusion upon the
individual could barely stand up to scrutiny. Yet the Court tipped the
scales further, reducing the significance of individual interests to a
level at which they may not counterbalance even a minimal public
interest. First, the Court essentially eliminated any requirement that
an intrusion be effective in combatting a harm. The Court cited statis-
tics which indicated that the checkpoint in question had a 1.5% suc-
cess rate in detecting drunken drivers. As this was more than the
0.12% success rate of the border checkpoint previously approved in
Martinez-Fuerte, sobriety checkpoints were considered to be effective
enough to be permissible.
The Court also further denigrated the individual's interest in re-
maining free from government intrusion by predicating the privilege
on good behavior. The measure of the impact of such an intrusion
was stated as "the fear and surprise engendered in law-abiding motor-
ists by the nature of the stop."'191 Presumably, the Court felt that the
innocent citizen has no fear of arrest,192 and therefore knows that she
will be able to pass a checkpoint without trouble.193 Such a standard
187. Id. at 2485.
188. Id. at 2486.
189. A purely "government" interest such as the cost of enforcing drunken driving laws or
medical care for victims would not have the same dramatic appeal as one combined with the
"public" interests involved here.
190. Cf. Clint Eastwood as "Dirty Harry" Callahan, upon being criticized for violating the
constitutional rights of a suspect to save a girl's life: "Then the law is crazy." DIRTY HARRY
(Warner Brothers 1971).
191. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2486.
192. Richard Posner has suggested that criminals have less reason to complain about Fourth
Amendment violations because their sensibilities are hardened by their life of crime. Richard A.
Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. Cr. REV. 49, 59-60. Combined with the
Court's belief that law-abiding citizens have no fear of Fourth Amendment invasions, see Sitz,
110 S. Ct. at 2486, it would seem that no one has a reason to complain about searches or seizures,
thus rendering the Fourth Amendment yet another inkblot on the Constitution. Cf. LAURENCE
H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONsTrrrTION 53-54 (1991); ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 166 (1990).
193. But see the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens: "These fears are not, as the Court
would have it, solely the lot of the guilty." Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2493.
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ignores the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment. It was designed
precisely to protect the innocent citizen who has nothing to hide from
being subjected to purposeless, intrusive government searches. Under
traditional standards, the government was required to demonstrate
some basis for suspicion before intruding upon an individual's privacy.
By making intrusion the norm instead of the exception, the Court's
standard of "reasonableness" as implemented in Sitz presumes all citi-
zens to be suspects until they prove themselves innocent.
6. Summary of the Administrative Reasonableness Paradigm
The variety of factual situations and policies at work in the cases
comprising the Administrative Reasonableness Paradigm preclude
one from setting forth a formulaic set of rules which would predict a
"correct" outcome in any new case. Indeed, the Justices themselves
have not taken consistent, predictable stands in these cases. 194 What
is possible, however, is to outline the factors that have been given
weight as affecting the judgments in these cases.
The Court always employs a balancing test in Administrative
Reasonableness Paradigm cases. On one side of the scale is the pri-
vate interest at stake, which has shifting components based on the in-
trusion in question. On the other side of the scale, the Court places
what is variously called the state interest, the government interest, or
the public interest. In the earlier cases, these interests appeared to be
used interchangeably; however, later decisions seem to make a distinc-
tion between the government or state interest, and the public interest.
Indeed, the government and public interests should be treated sepa-
rately. 195 Within each interest at stake are some components that bal-
194. Justice White wrote the majority opinion in Camara, See, and T.L.O., and joined the
majority in Ortega, Griffin, Skinner, Von Raab, and Sitz. Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice
Rehnquist also joined the majority in all these cases. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opin-
ions in Skinner and Von Raab, and joined the majority in Sitz.
On the other hand, Justice Blackmun joined the majority in Skinner and Von Raab, dis-
sented in Ortega and Griffin, and wrote concurring opinions rejecting the majority's reasoning in
T.L.O. and Sitz (with regard to the latter, cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 755 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., concurring)). Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Griffin, joined the ma-
jority in Skinner and Sitz, wrote a concurring opinion rejecting the plurality's reasoning in
Ortega, and dissented in Von Raab. Justice Stevens dissented from the majority's conclusion that
the search was justifiable in T.L.O., essentially concurred with the majority in Skinner, and dis-
sented in Ortega, Griffin, Von Raab and Sitz.
Thus, it appears that the Administrative Reasonableness mainstream has three solid votes
(Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy), one likely but not certain vote (Scalia), two unlikely
votes (Stevens and Blackmun), and three wild cards (Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg). See also
Schulhofer, supra note 125, at 107-08; cf. Junker, supra note 154, at 1166-69 (tallying up non-
unanimous Fourth Amendment decisions).
195. See Shields v. Burge, 874 F.2d 1201, 1204 (1989).
19931
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ance other interests separately. In other words, some portions of
private interests must be weighed against government interests; some
components of private interests must be weighed against public inter-
ests. As the Administrative Reasonableness Paradigm expands, it
may be that government interests and public interests weigh against
each other. Because the Court expressly evaluates these cases on the
"totality of the circumstances," all the circumstances must be eluci-
dated clearly and fully to allow a fair and even-handed evaluation of
the case at hand.
196
a. Private Interests
The foremost private interest in Fourth Amendment questions is
simply that protection which the amendment grants to the individual.
In cases involving searches, the interest implicated is the individual's
interest in privacy. 197 In cases involving stops or seizures, the interest
implicated is the individual's interest in freedom from unreasonable
government interference with liberty of movement. 9 8 The private in-
terest to be evaluated is based upon two factors: the protection that is
involved, and the degree to which the practice in question intrudes
upon that interest.
While it has been frequently emphasized that the Fourth Amend-
ment provides no greater protection for criminals than for the law-
abiding citizen, the converse may not be true. The new standard for
the measure of intrusiveness is the impact of the practice upon the
law-abiding citizen. 199 The intrusion upon the criminal is considered
no greater than that; indeed, it may even be considered to be less.2°°
196. Cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 502 (1981) ("Performance of this task
requires a particularized inquiry into the nature of the conflicting interests at stake here .....
197. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Price, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) ("'[W]henever a po-
lice officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that
person' and the Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be 'reasonable."') (quoting Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968)). Seizures have generally been considered less intrusive than
searches. See, e.g., Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541 (1990). But see Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1
(1985) (killing a non-dangerous fleeing felon does not reasonably outweigh the suspect's interest
in his own life); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (blocking a road with a bulldozer
may constitute a Fourth Amendment "seizure" of a fleeing suspect when his car crashes into it).
Intrusions of the same type, but for different purposes, are considered equally intrusive. See
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).
199. See Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2486 ("The 'fear and surprise' to be considered are not the natural
fear of one who has been drinking ... but, rather, the fear and surprise engendered in law
abiding motorists by the nature of the stop.").
200. "[A] person engaged in a dangerous, illegal business is likely to have greater emotional
fortitude than the average person." Posner, supra note 192, at 60 (advocating elimination of the
exclusionary rule in favor of tort remedies for Fourth Amendment violations).
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However, where the effect of the practice falls almost exclusively
upon law-abiding citizens, for whom the protections of the Fourth
Amendment were intended, 2 1 the private interests should be given
greater weight so that the need to intrude will be more closely
scrutinized.
b. Government Interests
The archetypical government interest at stake in Fourth Amend-
ment cases is the interest in law enforcement. Indeed, the Adminis-
trative Reasonableness Paradigm is founded upon the presence of
"special needs, beyond the normal needs for law enforcement. '20 2
These "special needs" may be based upon one or more of four factors.
The first factor is the urgency of the need for the intrusion. This may
be a temporal urgency, as in the fireman-entry cases, or it may be
based upon the severity of the proscribed conduct which is the reason
for the intrusion, as with railroad accidents in Skinner.20 3
The second factor may be characterized as the cause for the intru-
sion.2°4 Clearly, there must be some rational connection between the
intrusion and the purpose for it. This is typically measured by the
level of suspicion that the search will be successful. 20 5 Even where in-
dividualized suspicion has been eliminated as a requirement, there
must be some demonstrable suspicion that the group whose members
are to be intruded upon is actually a reasonable target for the purpose
of the intrusion.2°6
The third factor may be characterized as the effectiveness of the
method in achieving its ends. As construed by the Court, this factor
may be a largely negative limitation. While an intrusion that is de-
201. Schulhofer, supra note 125, at 88.
202. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
203. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), for a "traditional" law enforcement case
balancing these factors.
204. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 535 ("[I]n a criminal investigation, the police may undertake to
recover specific stolen or contraband goods. But that public interest would hardly justify a
sweeping search of an entire city conducted in the hope that these goods might be found.").
205. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1979).
206. Compare Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606-08 (drug testing of railroad workers involved in acci-
dents) with Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 683-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (testing Customs employees
without implication of drug use).
Cf. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L.




monstrably ineffective may not be justified,20 7 any degree of effective-
ness may be enough to justify the intrusion.
20 8
The fourth factor is the availability of alternate methods of en-
forcement. While the scrutiny given to this factor has declined from
Camara to Sitz, it is not clear that government officials may have un-
fettered discretion to implement any enforcement program without
the possibility of judicial review.
20 9
c. Public Interests
The public interests at stake in a Fourth Amendment case are
typically nebulously defined and selectively weighted by both sides.
Those favoring the intrusion speak of the impact on society, of the
harm to be controlled or eradicated. Those opposing the intrusion
speak of the impact upon society that the intrusion itself will have. In
Sitz, for example, the majority held that sobriety checkpoints were
constitutionally permissible because such checkpoints might reduce
drunken driving. The minority in Sitz, on the other hand, discussed
the impact of sobriety checkpoints in terms of the fear which would be
instilled in the mind of motorists.
A second level of public interests, not frequently discussed, is the
indirect effect of the harm and intrusion upon the relationship be-
tween the target of the intrusion and society.210 To properly balance
the public interest at stake in a Fourth Amendment issue, the analysis
should compare the relative effects upon the target's place in society
that result from the intrusion and that result from the harm to be pre-
vented. Such an analysis is especially important when the target of the
search is an identifiable and distinguishable group. When such a
207. Compare Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606-08 (demonstrated drug use among railroad workers)
with Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 683-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (no demonstrated drug problem among
Customs employees); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
208. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-55.
209. See Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the
Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173 (1988).
210. Discussions of such issues are rarely explicit. See, for example, the dissenting opinion of
Justice Stevens in Sitz: "[U]nannounced investigatory seizures are, particularly when they take
place at night, the hallmark of regimes far different than ours." In the accompanying footnote,
Stevens quoted Justice Jackson "soon after his return from the Nuremberg Trials":
These [Fourth Amendemnt rights], I protest, are not mere second-class rights but be-
long in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so
effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror
in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective
weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2495 & n.9 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 274 (1973) (quoting Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting))).
[Vol. 69:505
CLEAN SWEEP OR WITCH HUNT?
group is a "discrete and insular minority,"' 211 the public interest in the
social role of such a group may be comparable to the interest in eradi-
cating some particular harm.
III. APPLICATION OF THE Two PARADIGMS
A. Public Housing Sweeps Under the Home Paradigm
Under the Home Paradigm, public housing sweeps infringe upon
Fourth Amendment protections if public housing is considered a
"home." Courts which have considered this issue of what is a home in
other contexts have overwhelmingly answered in the affirmative.
From a property law viewpoint, an apartment in public housing is
no less a home than an apartment in private housing.212 If anything,
residents of public housing have a stronger claim to the possession of
their apartments as "home" than do residents of private apart-
ments.213 The standard CHA lease specifies that tenants "have the
right to exclusive use and occupancy of the leased premises." 214 Un-
like private housing, however, this right to exclusive use can only be
terminated for good cause.215 Furthermore, though the process is sim-
plified, Public Housing Authorities ("PHAs") must use eviction pro-
ceedings to remove tenants from public housing.
216
Where questions involving public housing and Fourth Amend-
ment protections have arisen in other contexts, courts have not made
distinctions on the basis of the type of housing. In People v. Dunn,217
for example, the New York Court of Appeals held that Dunn's Fourth
Amendment rights had not been violated by a canine sniff of the hall
outside his apartment. The court's analysis of whether the procedure
was constitutionally acceptable turned upon whether the "reasonable
211. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1937).
212. See Brand v. Chicago Housing Authority, 120 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1941).
213. Tenants in private housing classically have been considered to have an "estate for
years," which terminates at the end of the lease period, or a "tenancy at will," which may be
terminated without notice by either party. Tenants in public housing generally may only be
ejected for good cause, after notice and a hearing; thus, they have a "life estate determinable" so
long as they meet the standards for occupancy. See ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF
LANDLORD AND TENANT § 2.9 (1980).
214. CHA Lease, supra note 51, 9 7. Current H.U.D. regulations require the lease language
to read: "[T]he tenant shall have the right to exclusive use and occupancy of the leased unit by
the members of the household authorized to reside in the unit in accordance with the lease,
including reasonable accommodation of their guests." 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(d) (1992).
215. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(2) (1992).
216. See, e.g., United States v. 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Dean
P. Cazenave, Note, Congress Steps Up War on Drugs in Public Housing-Has It Gone One Step
Too Far?, 36 Loy. L. REv. 137 (1990).
217. 564 N.E.2d 1054 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2830 (1991).
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expectation of privacy" in Dunn's home was violated by the sniff.
Only in passing was it noted that Dunn's apartment was in a housing
project; this fact was never raised as an issue. The failure to distin-
guish on this factor in Dunn and in other search and seizure cases218
indicates that whatever the expectation of privacy is in public housing,
it is no less than that of private housing. A court operating under the
Home Paradigm would therefore grant a high level of protection219 to
public housing residents and hold the sweep program to be constitu-
tionally impermissible.
A tradition-based court sensitive to the Home Paradigm would
consider the personal stops and searches under the sweep program
similarly impermissible. The mere act of preventing residents from
entering their homes implicates the Fourth Amendment.220 Only nar-
rowly limited searches, involving no physical contact,221 have been
considered to be constitutionally valid in the absence of individualized
suspicion. 222 That the police may stop a person and subject him to a
pat-down search simply because he lives in a (government-provided)
high-crime area is plainly contradictory to established Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. 223
218. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1989) (search warrant for public
housing unit); United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (hallway of housing
project); United States v. Ricks, 882 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1989) (search warrant for public housing
unit); United States v. Ferreira, 821 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987) (seizure in hallway of housing project);
United States v. DeJesus, 806 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1986) (search warrant for public housing unit);
United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090, 1091-92 (11th Cir. 1986) (wrong address on search war-
rant for public housing unit); United States v. Buckner, 717 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1983) (third-party
search in housing project); United States v. Morris, 477 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1973) (improper affi-
davit for search warrant for housing project); United States v. Jones, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2764
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1991) (warrant for special narcotics team search in housing project).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 99-119.
220. See Soldal v. County of Cook, 942 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1991) (Flaum, J., dissenting),
rev'd sub nom. Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992). See also Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 548
("[T]he right against unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if the seizure of the
house was undertaken ... to verify compliance with a housing regulation.").
221. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (drug-sniffing dog); United States v.
Dalpiaz, 484 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1974) (airport metal detectors).
222. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
223. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). Cf. Justice Scalia's recent comments on
"stop-and-frisk": "I frankly doubt, moreover, whether the fiercely proud men who adopted our
Fourth Amendment would have allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being
armed and dangerous, to such indignity." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2140 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
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B. Public Housing Sweeps Under the Administrative
Reasonableness Paradigm
1. Private Interests
The private interests at issue in public housing sweeps include
those arising under the Home Paradigm.224 To hold that public hous-
ing residents have a less reasonable expectation of privacy than do
private housing residents would be contrary to established prece-
dent.225 Thus, under a reasonableness standard the heightened expec-
tation of privacy in the home would be regarded as a highly protected
interest226 and accorded a duly great weight in balancing against gov-
ernment and public interests. 227 The Home Paradigm, however, relies
on the normative judgment that the "physical entry of the home is the
chief evil"228 to be guarded against. Under that model, an intrusion
into the home is presumptively impermissible. Absent certain re-
stricted exceptions, the inquiry goes no further. Under the Adminis-
trative Reasonableness Paradigm, however, no invasion of privacy is
presumptively impermissible. Government action may intrude upon a
reasonable expectation of privacy and yet may, under the circum-
stances, be considered "reasonable." Thus, to properly balance the
interests under the Administrative Reasonableness Paradigm, it is
necessary to examine private interests at stake in public housing
224. See supra text accompanying notes 99-119, 212-18.
225. See cases cited supra notes 217-18.
226. Persons living in poverty may, in fact, need even more heightened protections against
invasions of the privacy and security of their homes: because they are less financially and socially
able to protect themselves from a higher level of crime than the more well-off are, and because
they may be more willing to give up what rights they have in exchange for protection. See Robin
Morris Collin & Robert William Collin, Are the Poor Entitled to Privacy?, 8 HARV. BLACK-
LETTER J. 181, 192-93 (1991).
227. The Court holds that warrantless searches of stone quarries are permitted because
the mining industry has been pervasively regulated. But I have no doubt that had Con-
gress enacted a criminal statute similar to that involved here-authorizing, for example,
unannounced warrantless searches of property reasonably thought to house unlawful
drug activity-the warrantless search would be struck down under our existing Fourth
Amendment line of decisions. This Court would invalidate the search despite the fact
that Congress has a strong interest in regulating and preventing drug-related crime and
has in fact pervasively regulated such crime for a longer period of time than it has
regulated mining.
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 608 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis added). But
see also Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("In Delta Airlines,
Inc. v. August, I expressed in dissent the view that the term 'costs' in Rule 68 did not include
attorney's fees. Further examination of the question has convinced me that this view was
wrong.") (citation omitted) (citing McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 176 (1950)) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("I concur in the judgment and opinion of the Court. But since it is contrary to an
opinion which, as Attorney General, I rendered in 1940, 1 owe some word of explanation."). Cf.
id. at 177 ("Precedent, however, is not lacking for ways by which a judge may recede from a
prior opinion that has proven untenable and misled others.").
228. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
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sweeps beyond those that are shared with private housing. Public
housing tenants have a particular interest which is not so significant in
other circumstances-namely, an interest in the continuing tenancy in
public housing. As some courts have recognized,229 evicting tenants
from public housing is a punishment beyond mere dispossession. The
poverty of most public housing tenants means they will have a difficult
time finding an affordable private housing alternative. Indeed, evict-
ing a tenant from public housing may effectively force them into the
ranks of the homeless. 230 Eviction from public housing also stigma-
tizes the tenant, making it even more difficult to find alternate hous-
ing in the private sector.
Under HUD regulations, 231 tenants of public housing may be
evicted for acts of their family or guests, even if they had no control
over or knowledge of the wrongdoing. 232 This eviction may occur "re-
gardless of the stage of any criminal proceeding. ' 233 In the civil evic-
tion action, the PHA need only prove guilt of the criminal offense by
a preponderance of the evidence.234 Thus, a tenant who is actually
innocent, or even merely legally innocent, may in practice be punished
more severely than under a criminal sanction.235 In such circum-
stances, the public housing sweep becomes a weapon, against which
public housing residents cannot protect themselves. Under these
rules, an entire family could be evicted if a relative or guest, stopped
and frisked at a lobby checkpoint or present during a search of their
apartment, happened to be carrying drugs, a weapon, or policy
slips, 23 6 even unbeknownst to them. Since HUD has shifted the bur-
den of dealing with crime in public housing to the residents them-
selves, using the carrot of continued tenancy and the stick of
threatened eviction,237 residents have an interest in maintaining that
229. See United States v. 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). But see
Dawson v. Milwaukee Hous. Auth., 930 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J.) (tenant shot
by another tenant had freedom to move out of public housing so as to avoid the incident).
230. 121 Nostrand Avenue, 760 F. Supp. at 1018.
231. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(5) (1991); Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 24
C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(2)(ii) (1992).
232. Public housing tenants have a statutory obligation to prevent criminal activity by their
family and guests, and failure to meet this obligation is cause for eviction. Public Housing Lease
and Grievance Procedures, 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(2)(ii) (1992).
233. Public Housing and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,560 (1991).
234. Id.
235. Whether it is preferable to spend a Chicago winter homeless on the streets or snug and
warm in jail is a close question. See also United States v. 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015.
236. "Policy" is Chicago's version of the "numbers" game. See generally OVID DEMARIS,
CAPTIVE Crry (1969).
237. [I]f household member criminal activity is ground for termination, then the tenant
has reason to try to control or prevent the activity to protect the tenant's right to con-
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degree of privacy and security that will allow them to deal with the
activities of their relatives and guests without the risk of premature
intervention and draconian punishment by the housing authority. By
creating a mechanism whereby residents may be punished for some-
thing they have not even had an opportunity to correct, rather than
merely failed to correct, public housing sweeps endanger residents'
interests in retaining the meager shelter that they already inhabit.
2. Government Interests
The government interests that would justify public housing
sweeps must be based on "special needs, beyond the need for normal
law enforcement. '238 Such needs may arise in two areas: where nor-
mal law enforcement methods would be ineffective in combatting the
harm in question,239 or where the harm to be combatted falls outside
the scope of normal law enforcement activities.
240
Under the Administrative Reasonableness Paradigm, the first
factor that comprises government interest is the purpose of the intru-
sion. Public housing sweeps have been justified for two purposes. Of-
ficially, they are described as emergency building inspections, carried
out under the terms of the lease, much as a fireman might enter a fire
scene to detect smoldering embers241 or a private landlord might in-
spect apartments after a plumbing leak to search for damage. Unoffi-
cially, sweeps are justified as an efficient method of removing guns
and drug dealers from the projects. However, neither of these justifi-
cations stands up under close scrutiny.
The CHA guidelines for public housing sweeps describe these ac-
tivities as "Emergency Housing Inspections. ' 242 Indeed, the lease
provides that the CHA may enter an apartment without notice in case
of a building emergency. Under the Administrative Reasonableness
Paradigm, emergencies requiring immediate action are a well-estab-
lished situation in which an otherwise impermissible government en-
tinued occupancy by the family. The standards proposed by some of the public com-
ment would allow a variety of excuses for a tenant's failure to prevent criminal activity
by household members. The proposed changes would thereby undercut the tenant's
motivation to prevent criminal activity by household members.
Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,560 (1991).
238. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
239. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2487-88 (1990).
240. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
241. Cf. Michigan v. Iyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
242. Inspection Guidelines, supra note 39, at 1.
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try is reasonable to avoid the delay caused by waiting for a warrant or
probable cause.
243
However, the very terms of the Consent Decree demonstrate that
sweeps are not conducted under "emergency" circumstances as within
the Paradigm. The Inspection Guidelines provide that emergency in-
spections may be made when the CHA has "reasonable cause to be-
lieve that there is an immediate threat to the safety and/or welfare" of
tenants, CHA employees, business invitees, or CHA property.2"
However, prior to conducting a sweep, the Chief Executive Officer of
the CHA must make written findings as to the reasons for the emer-
gency inspection.245 As part of a sweep, the CHA is required to pro-
vide an "operations center" to shelter residents temporarily
dispossessed or unable to return to their apartments.2' 6 Such facilities
must include heat, cooling, and restrooms and must make provisions
for the elderly and for children. Thus, the terms of the Consent De-
cree, accepted by the CHA, place substantial logistical burdens on the
Authority before it can conduct the sweep. In a true emergency,
meeting the terms of the Consent Decree would delay or prevent the
CHA from effectively dealing with the situation. Assuming that the
Authority would not consciously accept restrictions that would in-
crease the possibility of personal injury or property damage, it is clear
that the Emergency Inspection Guidelines cannot be contemplated to
actually apply to emergencies. This suggests that the "emergency"
classification is, in fact, merely a subterfuge to justify the sweep pro-
gram as falling within an area of "reasonableness" that would make
them permissible.
247
Furthermore, sweeps have frequently been triggered, not by
building problems, but by the occurrence of crimes.248 This distin-
guishes the sweeps from the type of municipal housing inspections al-
lowed in Camara. There, the inspections were performed on a
regularly scheduled basis.249 "Emergency" inspection would be per-
243. See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984) (fire scene); Michigan v. Tlyler, 436
U.S. 499 (1978) (fire scene); People v. Brooks, 289 N.E.2d 207 (Ill. App. 1972) (odor from dead
body could have been from live injured person, and so justified entry); State v. Miller, 486
S.W.2d 435 (Mo. 1972) (pat-down search of man lying face down in washroom reasonable as
emergency condition).
244. Inspection Guidelines, supra note 39, at 1.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 2.
247. Cf. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
248. See Recktenwald, supra note 65; Fornek & Seibel, supra note 68.
249. Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
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missible only upon "a citizen complaint or ... other satisfactory rea-
son for securing immediate entry. '250 However, such a complaint
would not justify the area inspections that were at issue in Camara,
but would instead justify only the entry into the particular dwelling in
question. As the Court pointed out, a criminal investigation for spe-
cific evidence "would hardly justify a sweeping search. . . conducted
in the hope that these goods might be found."'251
Moreover, the government's interest in eliminating crime from
public housing is be!;ed by its lack of interest in preventing crime.
One of the primary purposes of the sweeps is to remove gangs and
drug dealers from vacant apartments. But some buildings are almost
entirely vacant. 252 This high vacancy rate is caused by the CHA's fail-
ure to renovate and re-rent apartments that become vacant. 253 As
more units have become vacant, more tenants have moved out, in-
creasingly depriving the CHA of rental income and therefore of funds
to maintain the buildings. Poorly built to begin with,254 the buildings
have become nearly unlivable slums due to thirty years of neglect. 255
The growing vacancy of the projects, combined with the CHA's failure
to secure the buildings until the present, is a direct cause of the evil
that the CHA now wishes to eradicate.
CHA's physical neglect of the projects has also contributed to
these problems by creating an environment in which decay and disor-
der is the norm.256 Physical decay has been demonstrated to be caus-
250. Id. at 540.
251. Id. at 535.
252. In 1989, some of the buildings in Henry Homer Homes were 85% vacant. KonLowrrz,
supra note 3, at 262. In two of the buildings closed after the October, 1992 Cabrini-Green
sweeps, only 50 of 262 apartments were occupied. Tom Seibel, 5 More Buildings Swept at
Cabrini, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Oct. 22, 1992, at 3.
253. For a theoretical discussion of this effect, see Niels L. Prak & Hugo Priemus, A Model
for the Analysis of the Decline of Postwar Housing, 10 INT'L J. OF URB. & REGIONAL REs. 1, 5
(1986).
254. The Soviet minister of city and urban construction, observing the construction of Henry
Homer Homes in 1955, stated "We would be thrown off our jobs in Moscow if we left unfinished
walls like this." KoTLowrrz, supra note 3, at 22.
255. Kotlowitz documents one family's experience: apartment walls unpainted since the
1970's; inoperative oven; infestations of maggots and roaches; kitchen cabinets which had rusted
completely through; a bathtub faucet which couldn't be turned off, so that hot water continually
poured into the tub; overpowering odors rising from the toilet; sewage periodically rising from
the kitchen drain. The last two problems were eventually remedied after the CHA discovered
that the basement of the building was flooded with sewage, infested with roaches, fleas, rodents
and cats, and contained garbage, dead animals, and human and animal excrement. In the midst
of this was stored 2000 refrigerators, ranges, and kitchen cabinets, some brand new, and all
rendered unusable. According to the building janitors, the basements had been like that for 15
years. KoTLowrrz, supra note 3, at 27-28, 240-41.
256. See Henry Homer Tenants Ass'n v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 780 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ill.
1991), where the court, denying CHA's 12(b)(6) motion, held that there was a triable factual
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ally related to the social decay of the area. 257 Observable physical
decay signifies and stimulates social decline and disorder. 25 8 An atti-
tude of physical neglect spills over into the social realm. As the sense
of social and civic responsibility dissolves, residents have increasingly
less interest in maintaining the physical environment. Caught in a
classic feedback loop, the physical and social environments collapse
with ever-increasing rapidity.259 Social disorder, engendered by physi-
cal neglect and decay, is reflected in increased criminal and anti-social
activity.260  Given the CHA's history of neglecting the projects,
their choice of a clean-up method should be closely scrutinized. The
government's interest in making the projects a safe place to live is not
necessarily congruent with its interest in a particular method of doing
so. Clearly, any policy that does not address the physical problems of
the projects is doomed to failure. 261 Moreover, the choice of a
method that places heavy burdens on the constitutional rights of the
tenants requires that the CHA investigate alternative methods of solv-
ing the problem.262 In light of the sweep program's significant intru-
sion upon the Fourth Amendment rights of the tenants, the CHA
should not simply choose the "easiest" program, but should seek to
minimize the intrusiveness while achieving the same results. 263
The urgency of the government's interest in the subject of a
Fourth Amendment intrusion should also be balanced by the effec-
tiveness of the method chosen. The Court has taken an extremely
deferential view of effectiveness, 264 requiring only that the method ap-
pear to have some effectiveness. Public housing sweeps appear ini-
tially to be effective. 265 Residents report a feeling of safety after a
issue as to whether the CHA had engaged in constructive demolition of projects by failing to
maintain them.
257. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE 36-49 (1990).
258. Id. at 49.
259. See id.
260. Id. at 75.
261. To some extent, the CHA is doing this. See Henkoff, supra note 21, at 122.
262. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) ("And if there are other, reasonable
ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State
may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose 'less drastic
means."'); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Fourth Amendment protects privacy); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (same).
263. See Strossen, supra note 209, at 1208-67.
264. See Nadine Strossen, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock to
Meaningful Enforcement of Constitutional Rights, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 285, 293 (1991).
265. See Casuso, infra note 270.
After the October, 1992 sweeps at Cabrini-Green, the Chicago Police Department reported
that crime in the projects had declined since the sweeps. Maudlyne Iherjirika, CHA Crime
Drops, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 12, 1993, at 1. However, many residents of the projects attributed
the decrease to a city-wide gang truce, organized after the killing of Dantrell Davis. See Lee
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building has been swept and secured. However, the amount of crimi-
nal activity unearthed by the sweeps has been less than spectacular.266
Excluding contraband discovered in vacant apartments or public ar-
eas, and excluding arrests for undifferentiated offenses such as "disor-
derly conduct," it is not clear from the results that the intrusive
searches of occupied apartments have any real effect. Furthermore,
residents of the swept buildings indicate that drug dealing continues
"more quietly" after the sweeps.267 Empirical studies have shown that
the effects of police crackdown frequently "wear off" after some ini-
tial success. 268 Even where drug dealing is eliminated within a build-
ing by the sweep program, this method's inherent failure to deal with
the underlying psychological and social causes of crime in the projects
Bey, Dantrell's Legacy-A Cabrini Cease-Fire, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, at 3. Moreover,
the raw statistics cited by the CHA do not distinguish between swept or unswept buildings, nor
do they eliminate variables such as vacancy rates and level of building maintenance, nor do they
correct for variations in the crime rate in the city as a whole. Without such corrections, the raw
statistics indicating crime rate decreases simply do not support the proposition that the decreases
are the result of the sweeps.
266. In 10 days of intense sweeps through 31 buildings at Cabrini-Green in October 1992, 44
persons were arrested. Twenty-three of these were for criminal trespass, eight for disorderly
conduct, nine for drug possession, and four for undisclosed weapons charges. A total of seven
weapons were seized: one shotgun, two rifles, one handgun, one pellet gun, one BB gun, and two
knives. Seibel & Spielman, supra note 72.
In a sweep conducted August 16, 1991 in response to the shooting of CHA police officer
Jimmie Haynes, a search of five high-rise buildings at the Robert Taylor Homes uncovered no
suspects in the shooting. Six arrests were made for drug possession, criminal trespass, and disor-
derly conduct, and three weapons were confiscated. Jodi Wilgoren, Police Sweep CHA After
Guard is Shot, CHI. TRIa., Aug. 17, 1991, § 1, at 5.
In a sweep for guns conducted at Cabrini-Green Homes on the afternoon of August 8, 1991,
75 officers uncovered a single .30 caliber round and a holster in an area inaccessible to tenants.
Seventeen "suspected gang members" were arrested for disorderly conduct, and one man was
arrested for possession of a controlled substance. A second sweep with twice the number of
officers later that night resulted in 15 arrests and the seizure of four undescribed "weapons."
David Silverman, Cops Sweep for Guns at Cabrini, CHI. TRIa., Aug. 9, 1991, § 2, at 3.
A sweep of a 14-story apartment building at the Ida B. Wells Homes on November 16, 1989
resulted in the confiscation of three guns and the arrest of a man running through a corridor
carrying a shotgun. CHA Runs Sweep at Wells Homes, CHI. TRIa., Nov. 17, 1989, § 2, at 3.
A sweep at Cabrini-Green on May 4, 1989 uncovered a rifle and several handguns in a
basement crawlspace, and a 15-year-old girl was arrested for "concealing a large knife." 1 Arrest
in CHA Building Sweep, CHI. TRIB., May 5, 1989, § 2, at 3.
267. See Casuso, supra note 18, at 1.
268. Fifteen of eighteen case studies of police "crackdowns" showed initial effects of deter-
ring crime. In most cases, the effects began to decay soon afterwards, though other studies indi-
cated some overall residual effect. Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Crackdowns: Initial and
Residual Deterrence, 12 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1990).
The Rockwell Gardens project was one of the first swept in 1988 and 1989. In 1989, crime at
Rockwell dropped, but increased in 1990 and 1991 to exceed the 1988 level. Michael Gillis, CHA
Sees Decline In Serious Crime Reports in Projects, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Oct. 25, 1992, at 32;
Iherjirika, supra note 265, at 26.
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will not diminish tendencies toward criminality, but will merely redi-
rect them'into other avenues. 269
Expanding the scope of the inquiry only slightly beyond the
swept buildings indicates that public housing sweeps are not merely
ineffective in aiding the governmental interest in crime control, but
are actually harmful to that interest. By the CHA's own admission,
sweeps do not eliminate crime, but merely redistribute it.270 The
drug-dealing gangs evicted by the sweeps merely move to another
nearby building where there is no official opposition, and set up shop.
When the new turf is already controlled by a rival gang, the two fac-
tions sometimes battle it out until one can gain control of the area.
Rather than a reduction in drug use, the city is faced with an increase
in violent crime. 271 Sweeping the criminals out of the projects entirely
will merely displace them to private housing. In practical terms, the
sweeps may cause more crime than they prevent. This not only dimin-
ishes the strength of the possible government interest in the sweep
program, but raises in counterbalance the private interests of those
citizens surrounding the projects. Sweeps, evictions, and tenant re-
strictions may shuffle crime around; but unless the government can
claim equal distribution of crime as an interest, they are inappropriate
solutions to the problem.
3. Public Interest
"Public interest" may be the most determinative factor under the
Administrative Reasonableness Paradigm. At the same time, it is the
least objectifiable, and therefore the most manipulable,272 element of
this form of analysis. At first glance, the question of public interest
seems an easy one. Conditions in public housing are indisputably bad.
Eliminating crime and violence is indisputably an admirable goal.
Nevertheless, the importance of the interests at stake requires an
impartial weighing of the gains and losses resulting from continuing
the "sweep" program. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has been
269. See Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention: Its Theoretical Basis and Practical
Scope, 4 CRIME & JUST. 225, 226-27 (1983).
270. Jorge Casuso, CHA Crime Not Ending, Just Shifting, CHI. TRIB., July 16, 1989, § 2, at 1.
While reports of serious crimes in two swept buildings at Cabrini-Green fell from 13 to 6, re-
ported crimes in the buildings adjacent to those which had been swept rose from 15 to 48. Id.
CHA chairman Vincent Lane was reported to have said that he expected the gangs to move out
of the swept projects and into other nearby CHA projects. Id.
271. See results of empirical studies in Sherman, supra note 268, at 19.
272. See the dissent of Justice Stevens in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct.
2481, 2490-99 (1990).
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less than thorough in its evaluation of the "public interest" in Admin-
istrative Reasonableness Paradigm cases. 273 Indeed, the Court has
been almost entirely deferential to government interests in these
cases. Though the Fourth Amendment may be dead as a practical
matter,274 it is nonetheless instructive to engage in a more complete
analysis of the situation than we might expect to be forthcoming from
the current Justices.
As a starting point, the "public interest" promulgated for public
hcusing sweeps should be iimited strictly to its own terms. The inter-
ests of the residents themselves, and of the government in fighting
crime, should not enter into this evaluation. Each of these interests is
properly evaluated and weighed on its own. To include them again
under the heading of "public interest" unfairly tips the balance to ar-
rive at a certain desired result. While the Court has typically spoken of
"public interest" synonymously with government interest, there is no
good reason to imprecisely use a precisely differentiated term. Since
courts can distinguish "public interest" from "private" and "govern-
ment" interests when appropriate,275 using the term in a precise and
distinguishable sense adds meaning to the discussion.
One "public interest" that may be delineated is the interest of the
world at large, outside the projects. In this case, this interest may be
defined by the effect that conducting the sweeps would have on the
outside world, in comparison to the effect of not conducting the
sweeps.
The sweeps have already been shown to be ineffective at stopping
crime.276 Proponents of sweeps cannot claim, in light of the overall
273. See id.
274. John Wesley Hall Jr., Privacy: Drug War Casualty, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 17, 1992, at 19.
275. See Planned Parenthood of S. Nev. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.
1991) (balancing government interest in efficient operation against public interest in freedom
from censorship); Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543, 1552-53 (10th Cir. 1991) (balancing
public interest in alcohol content of beer against government interest in preventing "strength
wars"); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Mikva, J.)
(balancing public interest in free communication against government interest in protecting chil-
dren from "indecent" programming); United States v. Richey, 924 F.2d 857, 859-61 (9th Cir.
1991) (majority opinion) (distinguishing individual's private interest in the right to fair trial, pub-
lic interest in being informed about potential judicial bias, and government interest in protecting
confidentiality of taxpayer information); id at 866-67, 870 (dissenting opinion); United States v.
Moralez, 908 F.2d 565, 569 (10th Cir. 1990) (balancing public interest in relevant evidence and
government interest in protecting confidential informant); United States v. Odom, 895 F.2d 928,
931 (4th Cir. 1990) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting from denial of hearing) (government interest in
obtaining conviction balanced against public interest in freedom from repeated prosecutions);
Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 376 (5th Cir. 1989) (balancing firefighter's private inter-
est in communication, public interest in being informed, and government interest in efficient
operation) (opinion of Higginbotham, J.).
276. See Casuso, supra note 270 and accompanying text.
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absence of change in the crime rate,277 that conducting the sweeps
makes the community as a whole safer. Indeed, the CHA and the
Chicago Police have admitted that sweeping a building drives gangs
and criminals into the surrounding community.278 The public interest
of those residents in adjacent buildings does not include a program
which encourages drug dealers to move in and set up shop.
Thus, the sweeps provide no positive benefit to the general public
by reducing crime. The public interest may be further diminished by
the resources required to conduct sweeps. Operation Clean Sweep
has been terribly expensive. 279 Indeed, it is apparent that the CHA
could not obtain the funding to sweep all of its buildings.280 Since
sweeping part of a project merely relocates crime, there is no net ben-
efit in conducting a partial program of sweeps. To the extent that
sweeps use resources which could be put to other uses, a partial pro-
gram may be a waste of money and manpower. Alternative methods
of crime control such as community policing have been shown to have
a positive effect on crime at a relatively low cost.281 Additionally, as
the physical decay of the projects directly contributes to crime, any
funds expended on crime prevention without addressing the underly-
ing problems are wasted.
Even granting the assumption that the sweep program has a posi-
tive effect on reducing crime in the projects, it is not demonstrated
that the program will further the public interest. Contrary to popular
belief, housing projects do not disproportionately contribute to crime
in the surrounding areas.282 Living near a housing project does not
appear to be more dangerous than it would be living near a similar
large concentration of equally impoverished residents of private hous-
ing.283 Since outsiders tend to be afraid to enter the projects,28 the
crime within primarily victimizes the residents. Most of the residents
of the projects cannot afford to be mobile enough to pose a threat to
the world at large. Those crimes that residents do commit outside the
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. The estimated cost to sweep the CHA's 75 worst buildings is estimated at $30 million, or
$400,000 per building. Casuso, supra note 18.
280. See Henkoff, supra note 21.
281. See SKOGAN, supra note 257, at 89 passim.
282. See Dennis W. Roncek et al., Housing Projects and Crime: Testing a Proximity Hypothe-
sis, 29 Soc. PROBS. 151 (1981).
283. For a discussion of "concentration effects" upon the socialization of inner-city families,
see WILSON, supra note 4, at 58.
284. See DEVEREUX BowLy, JR., THE POORHOUSE: SUBSIDIzED HOUSING IN CHICAGO,
1895-1976, at 124 (1978); cf. E.V. Walter, Dreadful Enclosures: Detoxifying an Urban Myth,
XVIII ARCHIVES EUROPtENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE 151 (1977).
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projects are not dissimilar to those committed by other equally poor,
equally desperate citizens living in private housing.28 5
A broader issue of public interest involves the relationship of
public housing residents to society at large. The use of the sweep pro-
gram against public housing residents, and only public housing resi-
dents, marks them as less deserving of governmental respect and
protection. The sweep program is a public judgment that the privacy
of one group is less important than that of another. This distinction is
ret made because of race,28 poverty, or criminal behavior,28 7 but sim-
ply because of residence in public housing.
The sweep program thus sends a message 288 to the residents
themselves and to the public at large that living in public housing
makes one less of a citizen, less deserving of sharing in the protections
accorded to the rest of society.289 Public housing residence becomes a
stigmatizing290 and isolating characteristic.
The physical, economic and social characteristics of the projects
already contribute to isolating public housing residents from "main-
285. See GERALD D. Su-rrLES, THE SOCIAL ORDER OF THE SLUM 207 (1968).
286. In Chicago, the "bad" projects are largely confined to historically black areas (with the
exception of Cabrini-Green, in a formerly Italian slum), and CHA residents are overwhelmingly
black. It is safe to assume that most Chicagoans, thinking about public housing residents, as-
sume them to be black. Cf. SuTrEs, supra note 285, at 16 n.5 ("Anyone who lives in the
projects is automatically assumed to be a Negro or 'like the Negroes."'). Nevertheless, the
sweep program is aimed only at a subgroup of blacks, albeit an easily-targeted subgroup.
287. So-called "problem tenants" make up only 2% to 4% of the total public housing tenant
population. RICHARD S. SCOBIE, PROBLEM TENANTS IN PUBLIC HOUSING 58 (1975).
288. For a discussion of the message implicit in the denial of constitutional protections, see
Justice Brennan's dissent from the Court's denial of the petition for certiorari in Doe v. Ren-
frow, 451 U.S. 1022 (1982), denying cert. to Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), affg in
part and remanding in part Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979). In Doe, the
Highland, Indiana school system, in conjunction with the Highland Police Department and vol-
unteer canine units, used drug-sniffing dogs to conduct a surprise mass inspection of the junior
and senior high schools. Students to whom a dog reacted were instructed to empty their pockets
or purses. In 11 cases where the dog continued to alert, authorities escorted the students to
another office and strip-searched them. Doe was a 13-year-old girl who was subjected to such a
search, which uncovered no drugs. It was later determined that the trained canine was reacting
to the odor of Doe's own dog, which was in heat. Justice Brennan commented:
We do not know what class petitioner was attending when the police and dogs burst in,
but the lesson the school authorities taught her that day will undoubtedly make a
greater impression on her than the one her teacher had hoped to convey. ... Schools
cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good citizenship when the school
authorities themselves disregard the fundamental principles underpinning our constitu-
tional freedoms.
Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. at 1027-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
289. Compare this with the discussion of self-respect as a primary good and principle of
justice, which is secured by the affirmation of equal citizenship for all, in JOHN RAWLS, A THE-
ORY OF JUSTICE §§ 11, 67, 82 (1971).




stream" society.291 In many respects, the projects are not that differ-
ent from the rest of the "inner city. '' 292 Unemployment separates the
poor from the workday world in disproportionate numbers. Poverty
prevents the poor from moving away from where they live. The
outside world is afraid of the "underclass" and avoids contact with
them. The only role models available to children are themselves
caught up in poverty and despair. Lack of quality education prevents
the poor from breaking out of the cycle of poverty and dependence.
The sweep programs mark residents of public housing as the
worst of the worst. The programs have been imposed from "outside"
for the good of the residents, without asking what they believe needs
to be done,293 and without the freedom to decline. No attempt is
made to differentiate the innocent from the guilty; all residents are
presumed to be legitimate targets of government attention.294 The
message sent to the residents is that they are the problem, that they
are somehow different from others living in private housing just down
the block. As the residents grow to believe this,295 they will be in-
creasingly less likely to perceive themselves as having a common so-
cial ground with the rest of society. Seeing less chance of fitting into
society gives them less motivation to try to fit into society.
Furthermore, imposing sweep programs only on residents of pub-
lic housing suggests to society at large that these persons are different,
somehow lesser citizens than the rest of us. 296 Since the greater part
of the "outside" world has no other contact with the world inside the
projects, there is a danger that the notion that public housing residents
need special "control" to protect them from themselves might become
the dominant cultural perception. Thus marked as "culturally defi-
cient," public housing residents become increasingly marginalized and
291. BOWLY, supra note 284, at 224.
292. Cf. WILSON, supra note 4, at 57-58.
293. In the mid-1970s, some researchers thought to ask residents for their solution to the
problems of public housing. When it was discovered that the "one overriding preference" was
for increased police presence and protection, a pilot program of increased police patrols and
community relations was instituted, resulting in a decrease in crime. When the program was
terminated for lack of funding, crime immediately increased. See ALVIN RABUSHKA & WILLIAM
G. WEISSERT, CASEWORKERS OR POLICE 48-49, 56-58, 82 (1977).
294. The implicit message is that public housing residence is a predictor of criminal behavior.
Cf. Steven L. Carter, When Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 436 (1988) (uncon-
scious notion of skin color as a predictor of criminal behavior).
295. Cf. Peggy C. Davis, Popular Legal Culture: Law as Microagression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559,
1564-77 (1989) (discussing the adverse effects of an unconsciously racist legal establishment
upon the personal and social esteem of blacks).
296. See Olga Popov, Note, Towards a Theory of Underclass Review, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1095
(1991), for a representation-reinforcement-based argument for strict scrutiny for classifications
which target the underclass as a group.
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distanced from society.297 When public housing residents are re-
garded as deviants from the dominant culture, it becomes easier to
further impose burdens on them for their own good.298
Whatever short-term achievements are made by the sweep pro-
grams in fighting crime must be weighed against the long-term cul-
tural damage that may occur. The public interest is not in further
isolating residents of public housing from society, but in further in-
cluding them. The public cannot continue to bear the economic and
social burden of excluding a substantial number of its members from
constructive participation in mainstream life, marginalizing them into
a subjected and dependent role.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Something needs to be done about public housing in America.
However, sweep programs carry too many negative factors to be
blindly accepted as the only answer. Exploring the interests at stake
suggests ways in which public housing authorities may approach the
issue and derive the maximum benefit. First, while increased physical
security is necessary, the private interests of the legitimate tenants
should be a limiting concern in implementing a program. Searches of
apartments should be limited to vacant units, where no legitimate pri-
vacy interests are vulnerable. 299 While limiting public access to a
building may be no more objectionable to a tenant of public housing
than it would be to a tenant of a luxury high-rise, the building should
be secured only after proper notice is given to the legitimate residents.
Neither should limiting access be justified as keeping out "un-
desirables" if it limits the ability of legitimate tenants to freely associ-
ate with guests of their choosing.
Public housing authorities should also engage in alternative pro-
grams which indirectly fight crime in the projects. Vacant units should
be adequately secured. Housing authorities could concentrate re-
sources on rehabilitating particular "magnet" buildings to encourage
tenants to move into them, thereby locally reducing vacancy rates and
providing physical improvements with a narrowly focused economy of
scale. Rather than a resented police intrusion, public housing security
forces should provide a welcome police presence that differentiates
297. See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 133 (1989).
298. Or simply for the sake of repression. Cf. KARST, supra note 297, at 24.
299. See, United States v. Dodd, 946 F.2d 726, 728-29 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that living in
a vacant public housing unit did not provide a hiding suspect with an expectation of privacy
which society could find reasonable).
1993]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
between the "good" citizens and the "problem" tenants, and treats
them accordingly.
CONCLUSION
A theoretical framework may guide a court's hand in arriving at a
decision. Achieving an awareness of the control that such a frame-
work has, and exploring alternate perspectives from other
frameworks, may allow a more meaningful focus on the underlying
issues. Analyzing the constitutional legitimacy of public housing
sweeps requires such an awareness; without it, the outcome is likely to
be decided at the start. But whether such sweeps are permissible is a
more complex question than which paradigm they fit into. Fitting a
factual situation into a model which determines the outcome should
not be a substitute for reasoned analysis which takes into account all
viewpoints. The question is not whether public housing sweeps fit this
model or that model better; the question is what these sweeps are in-
tended to do, and whether they accomplish it. The answers may re-
veal as much about our own beliefs and prejudices as about what the
"correct" answer is. Our concern should be with what to do for public
housing residents, not what we are allowed to do to them. The des-
perate need to do something to make public housing livable should
not obscure the need to do the right thing.
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